International Socialist Review Issue 03, Winter 1997
80 Years
Since the Russian Revolution
by Ahmed Shawki
THE RUSSIAN
Revolution of October 1917 remains to this day the most decisive
event of the international workers’ movement. The Russian events
took place in the midst of the barbaric carnage known as World
War I. The swift overthrow of the Tsar in February of that year
and the almost bloodless Bolshevik-led insurrection in October
held out the hope for millions across Europe.
The Bolshevik revolution was by no means a specifically
"Russian" phenomenon. As Lenin was later to put it, Bolshevism
had become "world Bolshevism" by virtue of its revolutionary
tactics, theory and program. By indicating the "right road of
escape from the horrors of war and imperialism…Bolshevism can
serve as a model of tactics for all."1
The significance of the revolution was not lost on ruling
classes and politicians around the world, especially in Europe.
Fear that the revolution would spread gripped the bourgeoisie.
Not a friend of revolutionary socialism, British Prime Minister
Lloyd George wrote,
The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of
revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent but
of anger and revolt amongst the workmen against the pre-war
conditions. The whole existing order in its political,
social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of
the population from one end of Europe to the other.2
The prospects of revolution which produced paroxysms of fear
in the rich were eagerly welcomed by socialists. Victor Serge
wrote:
The newspapers of the period are astonishing…riots in
Paris, riots in Lyon, revolution in Belgium, revolution in
Constantinople, victory of the soviets in Bulgaria, rioting
in Copenhagen. In fact the whole of Europe is in movement,
clandestine or open soviets are appearing everywhere, even
in the Allied armies; everything is possible, everything.3
Anti-war socialist and journalist John Reed cabled the New
York Call with news of the Bolshevik victory. Under the
headline, "John Reed Cables the Call News of the
Bolshevik Revolt He Witnessed." The subhead read: "First
Proletarian Republic Greets American Workers." Reed began his
article with characteristic bluntness:
This is the revolution, the class struggle, with the
proletariat, the soldiers and peasants lined up against the
bourgeoisie. Last February was only the preliminary
revolution…The extraordinary and immense power of the
Bolsheviki lies in the fact that the Kerensky government
absolutely ignored the desires of the masses as expressed in
the Bolsheviki program of peace, land and workers’ control
of industry.4
The "proletariat, the soldiers and peasants lined up against
the bourgeoisie." This was the essence of the Russian
Revolution. October was not a coup conducted by a secretive and
elitist band. Above all, the revolution was about the
mobilization of the mass of ordinary Russians—workers, soldiers
and peasants—in a struggle to change their world. That is to
this day the most important legacy of the Russian revolution.
And this is why such considerable effort is still devoted to
distort, slander and misrepresent the events of 1917. This
article does not pretend to take up all questions of the
revolution—let alone what went wrong—but aims to outline its
main themes.5
In the autumn of 1932, a Danish Social Democratic student
group invited exiled Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky to speak
in Copenhagen on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of
the Russian Revolution. This speech stands out as one of the
most forceful and concise accounts of the October Revolution.6
Trotsky outlined a series of historical prerequisites
that was necessary for the October Revolution:
1. The rotting away of the old ruling classes—the
nobility, the monarchy, the bureaucracy.
2. The political weakness of the bourgeoisie, which had
no roots in the masses of the people.
3. The revolutionary character of the peasant question.
4. The revolutionary character of the problem of the
oppressed nations.
5. The significant weight of the proletariat.
To these organic preconditions we must add certain
conjunctural conditions of the highest importance.
6. The revolution of 1905 was a great school, or in
Lenin’s words, the ‘dress rehearsal’ of the revolution of
1917. The soviets, as the irreplaceable organizational form
of the proletarian united front in the revolution, were
created or the first time in the year 1905.
7. The imperialist war sharpened all the contradictions,
tore the backward masses out of their immobility and thereby
prepared the grandiose scale of the catastrophe.
But all these conditions, which fully sufficed for the
outbreak of the revolution, were insufficient to
assure the victory of the revolution. For this victory
one condition more was needed:
8. The Bolshevik Party.
This article will try to elucidate these basic features
outlined by Trotsky.
The Coming of the Revolution
IMPERIAL RUSSIA lumbered into the 20th century a much
weakened power than it had been 100 or even 50 years earlier.
Russia had lost considerable ground both militarily and
economically relative to its main rivals. The government of
Alexander II, in the wake of Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War,
took steps to implement reforms—to modernize the economy, to
modernize the ancient legal system, to "de-feudalize" the army
by making service compulsory, to allow a certain degree of local
autonomy. In short, it tried to drag Russia out of its medieval
past. But the measures adopted were often half-hearted and
designed to prolong the status quo rather than change it. Thus,
explaining the decision to abolish serfdom in 1861, Alexander II
said he decided to end serfdom because "it is better to get rid
of serfdom from on high than wait for its abolition from below."7
Of course this was true, but it overlooked the fact that the key
institution that needed overhauling was the autocracy itself.
The strength of the autocracy, the servility of the nobility and
the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie, was a key factor in
explaining Russia’s growing economic gap with the other European
powers. And while there was a spurt of industrial growth in the
last two decades of the 19th century, this was in the main
organized and carried out by the Tsarist state.
The state was also the main beneficiary of the program of
reforms and grew even more powerful in relation to the nobility
and bourgeoisie. As Marcel Liebman put it: "The nobility was
politically sterile, the bourgeoisie utterly impotent. The
entire history of Russia was molded by this negative factor, by
the absence of vigorous or even viable social classes and so
counterbalancing the weight of the autocracy."8
The defects of such an antiquated set up were exposed even more
clearly given the mediocrity and incompetence of those who were
born to run it—the Tsars themselves.
Throughout the 19th century they were men without vision,
courage or imagination. Their hatred of the intelligentsia was
but a reflection of their own intellectual incapacity. "Brute
force had become a vigor, and the most hidebound conservatism
served them all for a political creed and a program."9
The reforms that were designed to restore Russia’s might,
would instead contribute to Tsarism’s downfall. The effect, for
example, of the attempt to maintain Russia as a "Great Power"
would be profound domestically and internationally. As one
historian put it: "[O]ne result of this was the effort to
sustain the armed forces and defense industries of a modern
great power strained both the Russian economy and domestic
political stability. In addition, relative backwardness called
into question the empire’s ability to survive in a war against
the other powers."10
To focus only on Russia’s economic backwardness in
understanding the course of events would be mistaken. The key to
understanding Russia, as Leon Trotsky argued so well, is the
combination of the backward and the advanced, the old
and the new. In Trotsky’s words:
Russia’s development is first of all notable for its
backwardness. But historical backwardness does not mean a
mere retracing of the course of the advanced countries a
hundred or two hundred years later. Rather it gives rise to
an utterly different "combined" social formation, in which
the most highly developed achievements of capitalist
technique and structure are integrated into the social
relations of feudal and pre-feudal barbarism, transforming
and dominating them, fashioning a unique relationship of
classes.11
The consequences of such uneven and combined
development are made clear by looking at Russia’s economy.
Trotsky points out that while "peasant cultivation as a whole
remained, right up to the revolution, at the level of the
seventeenth century, Russian industry in its technique and
capitalist structure stood at the level of the advanced
countries, and in certain respects even outstripped them."12
This "combined development" in Russia produced a bourgeoisie
that was weak and heavily dependent on the Tsarist state and
foreign capital for investment. It also produced a working
class, though small in size, that was highly concentrated in the
most modern enterprises. In 1914, 54 percent of workers in
Russia were employed in factories of over 500, whereas in the
U.S. the figure was 32.5 percent. The Putilov metal works, which
employed 30,000 workers in 1917, was the largest factory in the
world at the time. In Petrograd, 60 percent of the workforce was
metal workers.13
Trotsky summarized the importance of the character of
Russia’s development in understanding the October revolution in
these words:
The first and most general explanation is: Russia a
backward country, but only a part of the world economy, only
an element of the capitalist world system. In this sense
Lenin exhausted the riddle of the Russian Revolution with
the lapidary formula, "The chain broke at its weakest link."
Trotsky goes on:
But the young, fresh, determined proletariat of Russia
still constituted only a tiny minority of the nation. The
reserves of its revolutionary power lay outside of the
proletariat itself—-in the peasantry, living in
half-serfdom, and in the oppressed nationalities.
The subsoil of the revolution was the agrarian question.
The old feudal-monarchic system became doubly intolerable
under the conditions of the new capitalist exploitation. The
peasant communal areas amounted to some 140 dessiatines.14
But thirty thousand large landowners, whose average holdings
were over two thousands dessiatines, owned altogether 70
million dessiatines, that is, as much as some 10 million
peasant families or 50 million of the peasant population.
These statistics of land tenure constituted a ready-made
program of agrarian revolt.
In order for the Soviet state to come into existence,
therefore, it was necessary for two factors of different
historical nature to collaborate: the peasant war, that is,
a movement which is characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois
development, and the proletarian insurrection, that is, a
movement which announces the decline of the bourgeois
movement. Precisely therein consists the combined character
of the Russian Revolution.…15
Russia’s Revolutionary Movement
THE COMBINED character of Russia’s economic development also
affected the development of politics and culture in Russia.
Again, Trotsky explains:
Precisely because of its historical tardiness, Russia
proved to be the only European country in which Marxism, as
a doctrine, and the Social-Democracy, as a party, enjoyed a
powerful development even prior to the bourgeois
revolution—and naturally so, because the problem of the
relation between the struggle for democracy and the struggle
for socialism were subjected to the most profound
theoretical examination in Russia.16
The works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels became available
in Russia because the censor opined that they were "an abstract
speculation" and therefore of little relevance for Russia. Their
works would help shape Russia’s revolutionary movement, but not
quite in the way they had expected. The main current among
Russian revolutionaries, the Narodniks (or populists), took
Marx’s denunciation of capitalism as showing that Russia would
be better off if it could bypass capitalism altogether. The
populists argued that the peasant Mir or traditional commune
could become the basis of moving straight to a socialist
society.
The later generations of populists, perhaps best represented
by an organization called Zemlya I Volya (land and
freedom), vacillated between two strategies—both of which
started with the assumption that the populists would act on
behalf of the people. On the one hand they went "to the
people" and tried to foment peasant rebellion, and when that
failed they took matters into their own hands and launched a
campaign of terror against the Tsar and his government.
The development of Marxism in Russia was very much
influenced by, and developed against, the ideas of
the populist movement. While Lenin accurately described populism
as reactionary (in its historic philosophical sense) he also
acknowledged the important role it played in the development of
a revolutionary movement in Russia.
The break with populism and the turn to the working class
came in 1883, when G.V. Plekhanov founded the Emancipation of
Labor Group. Plekhanov had enthusiastically endorsed militant
populism which tried to rouse the peasantry. But by the 1880s
several factors led him towards Marxism. First, despite
considerable heroism on the part of idealistic revolutionaries,
the great hopes of Zemlya I Volya failed to ignite a
social revolution, or even to produce any revolutionary activity
among the peasants.
Second, after the failure of Zemlya I Volya, populism
took a turn to individual terror, which Plekhanov rejected.
Third, Plekhanov began to doubt the economic viability of the
peasant commune as the basis of a new society. And, fourth, a
newly emerging industrial working class began to make itself
felt, leading Plekhanov to see workers as the key force in
Russia’s revolution.
Plekhanov developed what became the basic ideas of Russian
Social Democracy (synonymous with revolutionary Marxism today).
Two propositions of Plekhanov’s deserve mention.
Plekhanov argued that because the productive forces were too
low, the immediate political objective of the proletariat had to
be the victory of the democratic or bourgeois revolution. But
Russia’s bourgeoisie, a diminutive late-comer, was not going to
lead such a struggle or even give the struggle consistent
support. Echoing Marx, Plekhanov argued "that whenever the ‘red
specter’ took at all a threatening form, the ‘liberals’ were
ready to seek protection in the embraces of the most
unceremonious military dictatorship." This led Plekhanov to the
central operational question. "In conclusion," he wrote, "I
repeat—and I insist upon this important point: the revolutionary
movement in Russia will triumph only as a working class movement
or it will never triumph!"17
For 10 years after its founding in 1883, the Emancipation of
Labor Group remained largely an exile organization. But it
nevertheless played a tremendous role in spreading the ideas of
Marxism within émigré circles and in Russia itself. By the early
1890s, Marxist study circles, composed primarily of students and
intellectuals, existed in many Russian cities and towns.
Vladimir Ilych Ulyanov—Lenin—the future leader of the Bolshevik
Party, joined such a group when he moved to St. Petersburg in
1893.
Lenin was typical in many respects of the second generation
of Russian Marxists. Initially attracted to populism, he was
profoundly influenced by Plekhanov’s critique and by the growing
ferment among Russian workers. In this period, Lenin’s efforts
were directed in the main to fusing Marxism with the working
class movement. Lenin believed that "by directing socialism
towards a fusion with the working-class movement, Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels did their greatest service," because the
previous "separation of the working-class movement and socialism
gave rise to weakness and underdevelopment in each: the theories
of the socialist, unfused with the workers’ struggle, remained
nothing more than utopias, good wishes that had no effect on
real life; the working-class movement remained petty,
fragmented, and did not acquire political significance, was not
enlightened by the advanced science of its time."18
Therefore, Lenin concluded, "the task of Social-Democracy is
to bring definite socialist ideals to the spontaneous
working-class movement, to connect this movement with socialist
convictions that should attain the level of contemporary
science, to connect it with the regular political struggle for
democracy as a means of achieving socialism—in a word, to fuse
this spontaneous movement into one indestructible whole with the
activity of the revolutionary party."19
Marxism, for Lenin, was therefore, not simply a set of
economic laws or doctrines, nor simply a world view, but a guide
to action which had definite practical implications.
Marxism makes clear "the real task of a revolutionary
socialist party: not to draw up plans for refashioning society,
not to preach to the capitalists and their hangers-on about
improving the lot of the workers, not to hatch conspiracies,
but to organize the class struggle of the proletariat and to
lead this struggle, the ultimate aim of which is the conquest of
political power by the proletariat and the organization of a
socialist society."20
Lenin’s conclusions were not shared by all Marxists at the
time. Indeed, the very success of the Marxist study circles’
turn to agitation in the latter 1890s produced a distinctly
"anti-political" current, Economism, which glorified the
economic struggles of the proletariat. This current, echoing the
"revisionism" of the German Socialist leader Eduard Bernstein,
who argued "the movement is everything, the final goal nothing,"
aimed to limit workers to purely economic struggles, leaving the
political struggle to the liberals. In these views, the
Economists were the political forerunners of the Mensheviks, who
formed the moderate wing of Russian socialism after a split in
1903.
Lenin responded to the Economist challenge by arguing against
the arbitrary separation of economics and politics. It would be
counterproductive for a revolutionary to "adapt himself to the
lowest level of understanding" in a manner that would "put the
‘demands and interests of the given moment’ in the foreground
and…push back the broad ideas of socialism and the political
struggle." Revolutionaries should rather "connect socialism and
the political struggle with every local and narrow question."21
Lenin’s words have tremendous relevance and meaning for
socialists today. Revolutionary socialists, he argued, should
not simply talk to workers about factory conditions and
workplace struggles, but also about the "Brutal treatment of the
people by the police, the persecution of religious sects, the
flogging of peasants, the outrageous censorship, the torture of
soldiers, the persecution of the most innocent cultural
undertakings, etc." The reasons for making sure that political
agitation of this kind is carried out are not based on some
abstract "Marxist" principles, but flow directly from what is
needed in the struggle. Working class consciousness "cannot be
genuine political consciousness," Lenin further argued, "unless
the workers are trained to respond to all cases of tyranny,
oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter what class is
affected—unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a
Social Democratic point of view and no other."22
These ideas would become the cornerstone of the revolutionary
wing of the Russian socialist movement—the Bolsheviks.
Three Views of the Russian Revolution
IT WAS widely accepted among Russia’s Marxist revolutionaries
that the coming Russian revolution would be a bourgeois
revolution. The founding congress of the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party, stated:
The further east one goes in Europe, the meaner, more
cowardly and politically weak the bourgeoisie becomes, and the
greater are the cultural and political tasks that fall to the
proletariat. On its own sturdy shoulders the Russian working
class must, and will, carry the cause of the achievement of
political liberty. This is an essential step, but only an
initial step, to the realization of the great historic mission
of the proletariat, the creation of a social order in which
there will be no place for the exploitation of man by man.23
Russia was an economically backward country, with a weak
bourgeoisie, a weak industrial base and a small working class.
The country was overwhelmingly agricultural with only 4-5
million industrial workers out of a total population of 160
million.
The Mensheviks argued that because the revolution was a
bourgeois one, its leadership belonged to the bourgeoisie. The
working class would have to consciously subordinate its demands
and interests to those of the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks drew
direct parallels between the Russian bourgeoisie and the
bourgeoisie of France at the time of the French Revolution of
1789. It was a vital imperative for the Mensheviks that all be
done to safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie and to make
sure that they were not frightened by the prospects of a
movement from below.
The role of social democracy was to "exert revolutionary
pressure on the will of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie,"
and "to force the upper strata of society to lead the bourgeois
revolution to its logical conclusions." 24
Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not challenge the idea that the
Russian revolution would be bourgeois. "The democratic
revolution will not extend beyond the scope of the bourgeois
social-economic relationships," wrote Lenin.25 He maintained
this position until mid-1917.
But unlike the Mensheviks, Lenin refused to subordinate the
demands of the working class to those of the bourgeoisie or to
compromise the independence of the labor movement politically
and organizationally. Though Russia’s economic level permitted
only a bourgeois revolution, the development of a combative
working class meant that the bourgeoisie would be incapable of
taking the lead:
The bourgeoisie as a whole is incapable of waging a
determined struggle against the autocracy; it fears to lose in
this struggle its property which binds it to the existing
order; it fears an all-too-revolutionary action of the
workers, who will not stop at the democratic revolution but
will aspire to the socialist revolution; it fears a complete
break with officialdom, with the bureaucracy, whose interests
are bound up by a thousand ties with the interests of the
propertied classes. For this reason the bourgeois struggle for
liberty is notoriously timorous, inconsistent and
half-hearted.26
Because of this, Lenin argued, the working-class would take
the lead in the democratic revolution. He went on to argue that
since the peasantry had a real interest in ending Tsarism and
destroying the remnants of feudalism, the "only force capable of
gaining ‘a decisive victory over Tsarism’ is the people, i.e.,
the proletariat and the peasantry.… The revolution’s ‘decisive
victory over Tsarism’ means the establishment of the
revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry…
But of course it will be democratic, not a socialist
dictatorship…At best, it may bring about a radical
redistribution of landed property in favor of the peasantry,
establish consistent and full democracy, including the
formation of a republic…and—last but not least—carry ‘the
revolutionary conflagration’ into Europe. Such a victory will
not yet by any means transform our bourgeois revolution into a
socialist revolution.27
Leon Trotsky rejected the Mensheviks’ reliance on the Russian
bourgeoisie as strongly as the Bolsheviks. But this led him to
conclusions quite different from those of Lenin.
Following Marx (and largely in agreement with the Menshevik
theoreticians) he argued that the peasantry would not play an
independent political role in the revolution.
The peasantry cannot play a leading revolutionary
role…Because of its dispersion, political backwardness, and
especially of its deep inner contradictions which cannot be
resolved within the framework of a capitalist system, the
peasantry can only deal the old order some powerful blows from
the rear, by spontaneous risings in the countryside, on the
one hand, and by creating discontent within the army on the
other.28
Because "the town leads in modern society," only an urban
class can play the leading role and because the bourgeoisie was
not revolutionary, this role fell to the working class:
The conclusion remains that only the proletariat in its
class struggle, placing the peasant masses under its
revolutionary leadership, can "carry the revolution to the
end."29
But if the working class must lead the revolution, then the
working class cannot be expected to stop its struggle after the
overthrow of the autocracy. Lenin’s "democratic dictatorship" is
an impossibility.
The political domination of the proletariat is incompatible
with its economic enslavement. No matter under what political
flag the proletariat has come to power, it is obliged to take
the path of socialist policy. It would be the greatest
utopianism to think that the proletariat, having been raised
to political domination by the internal mechanism of a
bourgeois revolution can, even if it so desires, limit its
mission to the creation of republican-democratic conditions
for the social domination of the bourgeoisie.30
But this proposition clearly leads to a difficulty—one that
all Russian Marxists understood: Russia was economically and
culturally too backward for socialism. How did Trotsky propose
to overcome this problem? Given that Russia in isolation did not
have the economic prerequisites to build socialism, the Russian
revolution would have to be a prelude to revolutions in Europe
and elsewhere.
The Russian revolution will become the first stage of the
socialist world revolution.
The present productive forces have long outgrown their
national limits. A socialist society is not feasible within
national boundaries. Significant as the economic successes of
an isolated workers’ state may be, the program of socialism in
one country is a petty bourgeois utopia. Only a European and
then a world federation of socialist republics can be the real
arena for a harmonious socialist society. 31
Trotsky called his analysis the theory of "permanent
revolution."
The Revolution of 1905
THE REVOLUTION of 1905 was the first mass rising against the
imperial regime. It was, in Lenin’s words, the "great dress
rehearsal" for 1917. All of the elements of 1917 were there in
less developed form. Russia was embroiled in a losing war with
Japan, and troop discontent mingled with peasants’ desire for
land and the mass strikes of workers in the main cities for
economic and political rights. Also of critical importance was
the emergence of the soviets—or workers’ council—which first
made their appearance in St. Petersburg at the height of the
revolution.
The revolution began in January 1905 with Bloody Sunday —when
the Tsar’s troops massacred more than 800 workers in a mass
procession to humbly ask the Tsar for reforms. This led to an
explosion of mass strikes, mutinies in the army and scattered
peasant revolts. It ended in December of that year with a failed
uprising in Moscow under the slogan "the eight hour day and a
gun," inspired and led by the Bolsheviks. Though it ended in
defeat, 1905 was also significant because it cemented the
political differences between the Mensheviks, who concluded that
the revolution had "gone too far" and had therefore frightened
the bourgeoisie into the arms of reaction, and the Bolsheviks,
who were confirmed in their view that only the independent mass
struggle of workers could carry the revolution to success.
The soviet was a kind of workers’ government, made up of
elected delegates from Petrograd’s factories and workplaces,
concentrating all the forces of the revolution. Wrote Trotsky,
its president:
It was an organization which was authoritative and yet had
no traditions; which would immediately involve a scattered
mass of hundreds of thousands of people while having virtually
no organizational machinery; which united the revolutionary
currents within the proletariat; which was capable of
initiative and spontaneous self-control—and, most of all,
which could be brought out from underground within twenty-four
hours.32
The soviet’s premises, wrote Trotsky,
were always crowded with petitioners and plaintiffs of all
kinds—mostly workers domestic servants, shop assistants,
peasants, soldiers and sailors. Some had an absolutely
phantasmagorical idea of the Soviet’s power and its methods.
There was one blind veteran of the Russo-Turkish war, covered
with crosses and decorations, who complained of dire poverty
and begged the Soviet to "put a little pressure on Number One"
[that is, the Tsar]…
Trotsky recounts another case where an old Cossack sent the
soviet a letter asking for some help with a problem. He
addressed the letter "simply to The Workers’ Government,
Petersburg, yet it was promptly delivered by the revolutionary
postal service."33
The experience of the revolution’s high point—the Soviets,
the workers’ councils—would not be lost. Nor would the violence
unleashed by the state. After the suppression of the Soviet by
force, many workers drew a critically important lesson: "In the
clashing and creaking of twisting metal one heard the gnashing
teeth of a proletariat who for the first time fully realized
that a more formidable and more ruthless effort was necessary to
overthrow and crush the enemy."34
The 1905 revolution did not only exposed clearly the
character of the revolution in Russia, but also showed in
practice what the arguments between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
meant in practice. It also exposed the different currents in the
movement internationally. For example, it sparked a heated
debate inside the largest social democratic party—the SPD—in
Germany. Rosa Luxemburg brilliantly summed up the revolutionary
implications of 1905:
But for international social democracy, the uprising of the
Russian proletariat constitutes something profoundly new which
we must feel with every fiber of our being. All of us,
whatever pretensions we have to a mastery of dialectics,
remain incorrigible metaphysicians, obsessed by the immanence
of everything within our everyday experience…It is only in the
volcanic explosion of the revolution that we perceive what
swift and earth-shattering results the young mole has achieved
and just how happily it is undermining the very ground under
the feet of European bourgeois society. Gauging the political
maturity and revolutionary energy of the working class through
electoral statistics and the membership of local branches is
like trying to measure Mont Blanc with a ruler!35
Finally, 1905 had a massive impact around the world as Julius
Braunthal, one of the historians of the Internationals, writes:
It was an unforgettable experience, this first
revolutionary uprising of the workers since the Paris Commune
of 1871, and, for many contemporaries, the first experience of
revolution. To some it seemed that they were living through a
turning-point in world history and witnessing the start of a
new epoch of European revolutions.36
Years of Reaction
The years after 1905 saw repression on an unprecedented
scale. As the repression intensified, it was harder and harder
to keep any organization going. One historian writes:
The movement inside Russia had exhausted itself and its
remnants were being methodically cut down by Stolypins’
[Chairman of the Council of Ministers ] draconian policies. To
all intents and purposes the Party as an organized structure
had ceased to exist.… All the major centers of Social
Democratic activity were repeatedly hit by mass arrests
followed by an inevitable decline in the number of party
members. In Moscow, for instance, where the Bolsheviks had had
2,000 members in 1905, their numbers shrank to 500 by the end
of 1908 and by mid-1909 there remained only 260 members of the
Party.37
Many of the problems facing the party were made worse by the
fact that the intellectuals took fright and fled the
movement—and were never to return. One worker-Bolshevik,
Martsionovsky, a carpenter, wrote:
In a whole series of cities where I took part in illegal
work, almost everywhere the party committee consisted
exclusively of workers. The intelligentsia was absent, with the
exception of those on tour who came for two or three days. In
the most difficult years of the reaction, the workers remained
almost without leaders from the intelligentsia. They said that
they were tired…We, the underground workers, had to work without
the intelligentsia, with the exception of individuals. But on
the other hand, after the February Revolution, they showed up,
they beat their breasts and shouted "we are revolutionaries,"
etc., but in fact, none of them had conducted revolutionary
work, and we had not seen them in the underground.38
The period between 1911 and the outbreak of World War I saw a
revival in militancy and a corresponding growth in the Bolshevik
Party. In April 1912, the police fired on a demonstration of
striking miners in Lena, Siberia—killing 170 and provoking huge
sympathy strikes in Moscow and Petersburg. The revival of the
workers’ movement is reflected most clearly in the strike
statistics for the years leading up to World War I. One study
gives the following figures:
Strikes in Russia 1910-1914 39
Number of Strikes Working Days Lost (in
thousands)
Total Economic Political
1910 222 214 8 256
1911 466 442 24 791
1912 2032 732 1300 2376
1913 2404 1370 1034 3863
1914 3534 969 2565 5755
World War I and the Collapse of Tsarism
FOR MANY years, the Second International had proclaimed its
opposition to militarism and war. The 1907 Resolution of the
International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart reads:
If a war threatens to break out it is the duty of the
working class and its parliamentary representatives in the
countries involved, supported by the consolidating activity of
the International [Socialist] Bureau, to exert every effort to
prevent the outbreak of war by means they consider most
effective, which naturally vary according to the accentuation
of the class struggle and of the general political situation.
Should war break out none the less, it is their duty to
intervene in favor of its speedy termination and to do all in
their power to utilize the economic and political crisis
caused by the war to rouse the peoples and thereby to hasten
the abolition of capitalist class rule.40
These resolutions proved hollow. World War I saw the main
parties of the Second International abandon the slogans of
peacetime and throw their support behind their ruling classes’
own war effort. In every belligerent country, the socialist
movement split between "social patriots" and
"internationalists." The anti-war camp was, in turn, sharply
divided between advocates of "peace" and those, like Lenin, who
called for revolutionaries to turn the world war into a civil
war against their own ruling classes.
For Lenin, the betrayal of principles and the about face of
the German SPD was quite unexpected. When he first heard of the
reports that German socialists in the Reichstag had voted for
war credits, he did not at first believe them. And the anti-war
forces were small. Rosa Luxemburg sent out an anti-war circular
to 20 of the most left-wing members of SPD Reichstag
group and received only two responses. In 1915, the anti-war
socialists met at Zimmerwald in Switzerland and reaffirmed the
principles of international socialism. Trotsky wrote of the
meeting:
The delegates, filling four stage-coaches, set off for the
mountains. The passers-by looked on curiously at the strange
procession. The delegates themselves joked about the fact that
half a century after the founding of the First International,
it was still possible to seat all the internationalists in
four coaches.41
But this nucleus also formed the basis of a new,
revolutionary international—the Third International. The coming
revolutionary storm was to swell the ranks of the
revolutionaries into the hundreds of thousands across Russia and
Europe.
The war exacerbated the crisis of Tsarism in several
respects. The scale of the carnage and the human toll it exacted
was massive. Trotsky writes in his History of the Russian
Revolution: "The Russian army lost in the whole war more men
than any army which ever participated in a national
war—approximately two and a half million killed, or 40 percent
of all the losses of the Entente."42
The war and its cost domestically began to split the ruling
order in Russia. Some, with the Tsar at their head, believed the
war would cement Russian society through a patriotic outpouring
and would stave off social revolution. To make matters worse,
the Tsar decided to take personal command of the army and war
effort in the late summer of 1915. Even members of the Tsar’s
cabinet could no longer ignore the decay and stench. The Acting
Minister of Agriculture, A.V. Krivoshein:
Historians will not believe it, that Russia conducted the
war blindly and hence came to the edge of ruin—that millions
of men were unconsciously sacrificed for the arrogance of some
and the criminality of others. What is going on at
headquarters is a universal outrage and horror.43
As the war dragged on, it became more and more unpopular—both
at home and at the front. In the towns, food shortages became
frequent. Inflation and fuel shortages became permanent features
of the lives of workers in the cities. Dissent began to grow in
the factories and in the army. The Bolshevik leader,
Shlyapnikov, records in his memoirs:
By the end of 1916 the idea of "war to the end," to the
"final victory," was largely undermined. Anti-war feelings
were rampant…Despair and hatred gripped the laboring
masses…The government…stepped up their repressive methods of
fighting isolated manifestations of protest. Intensive
agitation was conducted against us in the press and through
the various organizations working for the "organization of
defense." Every resource was set in motion: accusations of
provocation, or German intrigues and bribes. But slander could
not halt the workers’ movement either: just like the
bourgeoisie’s other ploys it proved incapable of rousing the
proletariat to.…[fight].44
A sign of the decline and decay of the autocracy was the
growing influence of a drunk mystic, Gregori Rasputin. The
Tsarina called on Nicholas to act as strongman, but it was too
late—even if he’d focused his attention long enough to act
decisively. Instead, despondency accompanied decline.
Even the Tsar’s police could see that a revolution was
imminent. At the end of 1916, the police department compared the
situation in the main cities to ten years earlier and concluded
that "now the mood of opposition has reached such extraordinary
proportions as it did by a long way among the broad masses in
that troubled time."45 Trotsky’s remark about the
1905 revolution, "Every Paris concierge knew…in advance that
there was going to a be revolution in Petersburg on Sunday,
January 9,"46 applied equally to 1917. Revolution was
in the air, not only because those at the bottom of society
wanted a change, but so too did those at the top. In Lenin’s
words,
For a revolution to take place, it is not usually
sufficient for the ‘lower classes not to want’ to live in the
old way; it is also necessary that the ‘upper classes should
be unable’ to live in the old way.47
The February Revolution
THE PRELUDE to the February revolution consisted of a series
of strikes and demonstrations in Petrograd commemorating Bloody
Sunday. The strike movement spread and deepened after workers at
the giant Putilov Works were locked out for demanding a wage
increase. Even the most militant section of the Bolshevik Party,
the Vyborg district, urged that the strikes end for fear that
conditions weren’t yet ripe for mass, militant action. Then on
February 23—International Women’s Day—women textile workers
poured into the streets of Petrograd demanding bread. As Trotsky
explained:
The 23rd of February was International Women’s Day. The
social-democratic circles had intended…meetings, speeches,
leaflets. It had not occurred to anyone that it might become
the first day of the revolution. Not a single organization
called for strikes that day.48
The women textile workers of Petrograd came out on strike and
dragged behind them the Bolshevik-led metal workers of the
Vyborg district. As one of the leaders of the Bolshevik Vyborg
District Committee, Kayurov, put it, "with reluctance, the
Bolsheviks agreed to this."49 Indeed, Kayurov later remarked
that he had tried to talk the women workers out of taking any
action at all.50
Trotsky remarks, "Thus the fact is that the February
revolution was begun from below, overcoming the resistance of
its own revolutionary organizations, the initiative being taken
of their own accord by the most oppressed and downtrodden part
of the proletariat—the women textile workers, among them no
doubt many soldiers’ wives."51
By the end of the day, 90,000 workers were on strike—without
the shootings the Bolsheviks had feared. The next day, the 24th,
about half of Petrograd’s workers were on strike and large
numbers of them were demonstrating in the streets. The slogan
"Bread!" writes Trotsky, "is crowded out or obscured by louder
slogans: ‘Down with the autocracy,’ ‘Down with the war!’"
Fearful that the infantry would not obey orders to shoot on
unarmed workers, the government brought out its most reliable
troops, the Cossack cavalry. The Cossacks did not mutiny, but
neither did they act as they were expected to:
…the Cossacks constantly, though without ferocity, kept
charging the crowd…The mass of the demonstrators would part to
let them through, and close up again. There was no fear in the
crowd. "The Cossacks promise not to shoot," passed from mouth
to mouth.52
The disintegration of the Tsar’s armed forces was evident to
the demonstrators. In the streets of the Nevsky Prospekt in
Petrograd a Bolshevik worker and demonstrator saw the front
ranks of the crowd, pressed forward by those behind, come closer
and closer to a cordon of soldiers:
[T]he tips of the bayonets were touching the breasts of the
first row of demonstrators. Behind could be heard the singing
of revolutionary songs, in front there was confusion. Women,
with tears in their eyes, were crying out to the soldiers,
"Comrades, take away your bayonets, join us!" The soldiers
were moved. They threw swift glances at their own comrades.
The next moment one bayonet is slowly raised, is slowly lifted
above the shoulders of the approaching demonstrators. There is
thunderous applause. The triumphant crowd greeted their
brothers clothed in the gray cloaks of the soldiery. The
soldiers mixed freely with the demonstrators.53
Another three days of this and it was all over for the Tsar.
On the night of the 26th the reserve battalions of the Volynsky
Regiment mutinied. The following morning they killed their
commanding officer and joined the workers’ demonstrations.
General Khabalov, commander of the Petrograd military garrison,
conceded on the evening of the 27th, saying, "…I cannot fulfill
the command to re-establish order in the capital. Most of the
units one by one have betrayed their duty, refusing to fight the
rioters."54 The speed of the army’s mutiny was
striking. On February 26 there were six hundred mutineers; three
days later the whole Petrograd garrison of 170,000 had rebelled.
On February 26, Michael V. Rodzyanko, president of the lame
Duma, wired the Tsar:
Anarchy in the capital, government paralyzed…shooting in
the streets…supplies of food and fuel completely
disrupted…universal dissatisfaction growing…there must be no
delay in forming a new government enjoying the confidence of
the country. Any hesitation would mean death. I pray to God
that in this hour no responsibility falls on the monarch.55
The Tsar’s reply was to delay the opening of the Duma. Its
members were at a loss. "I do not want to revolt," exclaimed
Rodzyanko.
I am no rebel. I have made no revolution and do not intend
to make one…I am no revolutionary. I will not rise up against
the supreme power. I do not want to. But there is no
government any longer. Everything falls to me…All the phones
are ringing. Everybody asks me what to do. What shall I say?
Shall I step aside? Wash my hands in innocence? Leave Russia
without a government? After all, it is Russia! Have we not a
duty to our country? What shall I do? Tell me, what?56
In the end, Rodzyanko sent another telegram pleading with the
Tsar to intervene. "Situation worsening. Immediate steps are
necessary, for tomorrow it will be too late. The last hour has
come in which the fate of the country and the dynasty is being
decided." Forever vigilant and astute, the Tsar was unmoved.
"That fat Rodzyanko has again sent me some nonsense to which I
will not even reply," he commented to Count Fredericks, minister
of the court.57
The Tsar’s imbecility achieved a truly remarkable feat: it
forced a majority of the Duma’s members to go against his
wishes. Not wanting to offend, they refused to disperse, but met
only in an unofficial capacity. Rodzyanko, who contemplated the
possibility of the Tsar’s abdication with "unspeakable sadness,"
had just advised Tsarist authorities to use their firehoses to
disperse demonstrators. But the situation needed resolution. At
midnight on February 27, the Duma’s leaders proclaimed the
formation of a provisional government. Their intent was clear.
As the leader of the bourgeois Cadet Party, Miliukov, put it:
"to direct into a peaceful channel the transfer of power which
it had preferred to receive, not from below, but from above."
The Duma had no choice but "to take power into its own hands and
try to curb the growing anarchy," wrote Rodzyanko.58
As the Duma leaders proclaimed a new government, the last of the
Romanovs recorded the proud achievements of his last night in
power: "read a great deal about Julius Caesar" and slept "long
and deeply."59 Three centuries of Romanovs finally
came to an ignominious end—the Tsar abdicated on March 2.
The February revolution brought a bourgeois government headed
by Prince Lvov to office—but it also created another center of
power: the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Indeed, in
the first days after the fall of the Tsar, effective power was
in the hands of the Soviets. The old state had collapsed and the
bourgeoisie was reluctant to take power. But so too was the
leadership of the Soviets—then in the hands of the Mensheviks
and the peasant party, the Social Revolutionaries (SRs). In
their view, the aim of the revolution was the achievement of a
bourgeois democratic republic. They were ready and eager to
support the new government to see that the tasks of the
"bourgeois revolution" were carried out. As the Menshevik
Potresov expressed it: "at the moment of the bourgeois
revolution, the [class] best prepared, socially and
psychologically, to solve national problem is [the]
bourgeoisie."60
The new government was above all concerned with a return to
order: restoring the authority of the officers in the army and
of management over workers in industrial enterprises over the
workers. Before declaring a provisional government they aptly
called themselves ‘The Committee for the Re-establishment of
Order and Relations with Public Institutions and Personages."
Their sole preoccupation was stabilizing Russian society—and of
course to carrying on the war. Until that time, the other issues
raised by the revolution—land reform, the demands of the
non-Russian nationalities, the election of a Constituent
Assembly, and so on, could all wait. One historian summarizes
the approach of the new Provisional Government to the crisis it
inherited:
How did the government deal with the problems it had
inherited? It prolonged the war and trod in the Tsar’s
footsteps. To continue Tsarist foreign policy and combine it
with an adventurous military offensive would, it was hoped,
divert attention from the problems of the home front. In
Chernov’s words—"The propertied classes regarded a military
victory and its concomitant chauvinism as the only way to
avoid aggravation of the social revolution."61
Right up to its overthrow in October, the Provisional
Government would doggedly stick to prosecuting the
war—effectively laying the basis for its undoing. "If the
revolution did not finish the war," wrote the Menshevik
Sukhanov, "then the war would strangle the revolution."62
But the provisional government also had a big problem. It
didn’t have the power to rule on its own. As the Minister of War
and the Navy, Guchkov, wrote to the Commander in Chief, General
Alekseev, on March 9:
The Provisional Government has no real authority at its
disposal and its decrees are carried out only to the extent
this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’
Deputies which has in its hands the most important elements of
real power, such as the army, the railways, the post and
telegraph.… In particular, it is now possible to give only
these orders which do not radically conflict with the orders
of the above-named Soviet.63
Reorienting the Bolshevik Party
BOLSHEVIK PARTY leaders in Russia during the February
revolution largely accommodated to the Menshevik-SR political
line. They clung to the notion that the Russian revolution had
to limit itself to a bourgeois aims. They tried to take a
verbally critical stance, but effectively served as the left
face of the soviet majority, which itself covered for the
Provisional Government. The new editors of Pravda,
Kamenev and Stalin, who returned from exile in Siberia,
"Pronounced that the Bolsheviks would decisively support the
Provisional Government ‘insofar as it struggles against reaction
or counter-revolution’ forgetting that the only important agent
of counter revolution at the time was this same Provisional
Government," writes Tony Cliff caustically.64
Although there was considerable opposition within the party to
the political line adopted towards the Provisional Government,
it would take Lenin’s return from exile, on April 3, 1917, to
decisively shift the party—indeed, the whole course of the
revolution.
At a meeting in March of the Provisional Government, when
ministers were discussing Bolshevik agitation, Kerensky blurted
out: "Just wait, Lenin himself is coming. Then the real thing
will start."65 The "real thing" did indeed start—but
in a way noone anticipated.
Lenin arrived at the Finland railway station—which was
located in the Bolshevik stronghold of the Vyborg district. Like
Plekhanov, who had returned a few days earlier, Lenin was
welcomed by a group of dignitaries including Chkheidze, the
Menshevik chair of the Petrograd Soviet. The description of the
official meeting deserves to be quoted in full, despite its
length:
Behind Shlyapnikov, at the head of a small cluster of
people behind whom the door slammed again at once, Lenin came,
or rather ran, into the room. He wore a round cap, his face
looked frozen, and there was a magnificent bouquet in his
hands. Running to the middle of the room, he stopped in front
of Chkheidze as though colliding with a completely unexpected
obstacle. And Chkheidze, still glum, pronounced the following
"speech of welcome" with not only the spirit and wording but
also the tone of a sermon. "Comrade Lenin, in the name of the
Petersburg Soviet and of the whole revolution we welcome you
to Russia…But—we think that the principal task of the
revolutionary democracy is now the defense of the revolution
from any encroachments either from within or from without. We
consider that what this goal requires is not disunity, but the
closing of the democratic ranks. We hope you will pursue these
goals together with us."
Chkheidze stopped speaking. I was dumbfounded with
surprise: really, what attitude could be taken to this
"welcome" and to that delicious "But-"
But Lenin knew exactly how to behave. He stood there as
though nothing taking place had the slightest connection with
him—looking about him, examining the persons round him and
even the ceiling of the imperial waiting-room, adjusting his
bouquet (rather out of tune with his whole appearance), and
then, turning away from the Ex.Com. delegation altogether, he
made this reply:
"Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors, and workers! I am happy
to greet in your persons the victorious Russian revolution,
and greet you as the vanguard off the worldwide proletarian
army…The piratical imperialist war is the beginning of civil
war throughout Europe…The hour is not far distant when at the
call of our [German] comrade, Karl Liebknecht, the people will
turn their arms against their own capitalist exploiters…The
worldwide socialist revolution has already dawned…Germany is
seething…Any day now the whole of European capitalism may
crash. The Russian revolution accomplished by you has prepared
the way and opened a new epoch. Long live the worldwide
socialist revolution!"
Appealing from Chkheidze to the workers and soldiers, from
the provisional government to Liebknecht, from the defense of
the fatherland to international revolution —this is how Lenin
indicated the tasks of the proletariat.66
Sukhanov summed up Lenin’s speech to a Bolshevik party
meeting that day:
I shall never forget that thunder-like speech, which
startled and amazed not only me, a heretic who had
accidentally dropped in, but all the true believers. I am
certain that no one had expected anything of the sort.67
The response to Lenin’s speech was that of stunned silence.
He was denounced from all sides. "A man who talks that kind of
stupidity is not dangerous," exclaimed Stakevich, a moderate
socialist. Bogdanov, a Menshevik: "That is raving, the ravings
of a lunatic! It is indecent to applaud this claptrap!" A member
of the Bolsheviks, Zalezhki, noted: "On that day (April 4)
Comrade Lenin could not find open sympathizers even in our own
ranks." Lenin’s speech, she remembers "produced on everyone a
stupefying impression. No one expected this. On the contrary,
they expected Vladimir Ilych to arrive and call to order the
Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and especially Comrade
Molotov, who occupied a particularly irreconcilable position
with respect to the Provisional Government.68
On April 9, Pravda, the Bolshevik party newspaper, ran an
editorial attacking Lenin written by Central Committee member,
L.B. Kamenev:
As for the general schema of Lenin, its seems to us
unacceptable in that it starts from the assumption that the
bourgeois-democratic revolution is ended and counts upon an
immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist
revolution.69
But Lenin refused to be cowed. He launched an attack of his
own. As he had done in 1905, he attacked those "old Bolsheviks"
who continued to apply policies and methods which were
appropriate for one period, but now acted as a hindrance to the
aims of the revolution. For example, he attacked Kamenev’s "old
Bolshevik" formula that "the bourgeois revolution is not
completed" as "obsolete." "It is no good at all. It is dead. And
it is no use trying to revive it." He criticized the old
Bolsheviks for refusing to abandon the formula of the
"revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and
the peasantry"—which was his slogan at the start of the 1905
revolution. Those who wanted to hang on to that idea, said
Lenin, "should be consigned to the archive of ‘Bolshevik"
pre-revolutionary antiques (it may be called the archive of ‘Old
Bolsheviks’).70
Lenin answered his critics by hammering home the central
point: the workers can only rely on themselves.
Ours is a bourgeois revolution, therefore, the workers must
support the bourgeoisie, say the Potresovs, Gvozdyovs and
Chkheidzes, as Plekhanov said yesterday.
Our is a bourgeois revolution, we Marxists say, therefore
the workers must open the eyes of the people to the deception
practiced by the bourgeois politicians and teach them to put
no faith in words, to depend entirely on their own strength,
their own organization, their own unity, and their own
weapons.71
In effect, Lenin was adopting Trotsky’s ‘permanent
revolution’ position. The first stage of the revolution had
created a situation of "dual power," in which the working class
and rebellious soldiers were not yet conscious of the need to
sweep away the bourgeois Provisional Government. The task now
was to win over a majority of the proletariat to the side of
Bolshevism.
No support for the Provisional Government.… Exposure (of)
the impermissible, illusion-breeding "demand" that this
government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an
imperialist government… The masses must be made to see that
the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies are the only possible form of
revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as
long as this government yields to the influence of the
bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic and persistent
explanation of the errors of their tactics, an explanation
especially adapted to the needs of the masses. As long as we
are in a minority we carry on the work of criticizing and
exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity
of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of
Workers’ Deputies so that the people may overcome their
mistakes by experience. Not a parliamentary republic.…but a
republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Laborers and
Peasants’ Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.72
Lenin’s isolation among the leaders of the Bolsheviks can be
gauged by the outcome of a debate and vote on Lenin’s views at a
Petrograd Committee meeting on April 8. Those opposing Lenin
handily won the vote thirteen to two, with one abstention.
Similar results were recorded in Moscow and other local
Bolshevik committees.73
But several factors worked in Lenin’s favor. First, many of
the rank and file members of the party were already unhappy with
the line of accommodation to the Provisional Government being
pushed by Kamenev, Stalin and the former Duma deputy M.K.
Muranov. Indeed some members in Petrograd had called for their
expulsion from the party.
Moreover, even if the Bolsheviks’ Petrograd leadership tailed
behind the Mensheviks and SRs, the Bolshevik members did not
have the same instincts as those of the Mensheviks. As Trotsky
notes, the whole history and training of the Bolsheviks led them
in the direction of identifying with the masses rather than the
new bourgeois government. Trotsky writes:
The worker-Bolsheviks immediately after the revolution took
the initiative in the struggle for the eight-hour day; the
Mensheviks declared this demand untimely. The Bolsheviks took
the lead in arresting the Tsarist officials; the Mensheviks
opposed "excesses." The Bolsheviks energetically undertook the
creation of a workers’ militia; the Mensheviks delayed the
arming of the workers, not wishing to quarrel with the
bourgeoisie. Although not yet overstepping the bounds of
bourgeois democracy, the Bolsheviks acted, or strove to
act—however confused by their leadership—like uncompromising
revolutionists. The Mensheviks sacrificed their democratic
program at every step in the interests of a coalition with the
liberals.74
Second, the very course of the revolution, and in particular
the government’s continued escalation to the war effort, was a
confirmation of the validity of Lenin’s views. Third, the
numbers of workers, soldiers and peasants drawn into the
revolution continued to grow—as did their hostility to the
government and their gravitation to the Bolsheviks; fourth, the
Bolshevik party itself entered a period of explosive growth. In
the two months since February, party membership swelled from
24,000 to 80,000. Finally, Lenin carried enormous political
weight among the cadres of the Bolshevik party. Indeed, Trotsky
is undoubtedly right in saying that only Lenin could have
reoriented the party so quickly and with so little damage. By
mid-April, Lenin’s attempts to win over the party reached an
important turning point: He succeeded in winning a majority at a
conference of Bolsheviks held in Petrograd on April 14. By the
end of April, Lenin had decidedly won the party over to his
views.
No sooner had Lenin won the party over did the opposite
danger come to the fore. The same militants who supported
Lenin’s "no support for the Provisional Government" slogan
tended to be involved in head-on clashes with the government.
The slogan of "no support" was soon transformed into one of
"Down with the Provisional Government." Lenin now swung from the
party’s left to its right, calling such slogans "premature" and
"adventurist." Petrograd’s workers were well ahead of the rest
of the country, and the danger existed of a premature
confrontation with the government which would leave the most
militant sections of the movement isolated. The Bolshevik
strategy was to rely on peaceful agitation and propaganda to win
over a majority in the Soviets. This was the strategy that the
Bolsheviks intended to follow, but the actual course of the
struggle forced them to adopt a different course.
On May 1, Guchkov, Minister of War and the Navy, resigned his
post from the Provisional Government. He announced that he was
no longer able to fulfill his duties because of the continued
disintegration and open rebellion in the army: "conditions which
I am powerless to alter and which threaten the defense and,
freedom and even the existence of Russia with fatal
consequences."75 One graphic symptom of the collapse
of the Russian army was the ever rising number of deserters. The
total number of registered deserters (as opposed to a much
larger but unknown total number of deserters) from the outbreak
of war to February 1917, was 195,130, or 3,423 per fortnight.
From the beginning of the revolution to May 15, the number rose
to 85,921 or 17,185 per fortnight.76
The collapse of the army was one reflection of the growing
rebellion among peasants throughout the country. Writes Lionel
Kochan: "The storm in the countryside burst in April.
Statistics, necessary incomplete, show an unmistakable and
sudden upsurge. In March the number of districts affected by
peasant disorders had been 34; in April it was 174; in May 236;
in June 280; and in July 325."77
The government’s response to this crisis was to try to expand
its base of support—especially among the Mensheviks and the SRs
who still held a majority in the Soviets. In late April, these
parties entered the Provisional Government. The right-wing SR
Alexander Kerensky became minister of war. From May onwards, the
revolution’s advance required fighting not only the bourgeoisie,
but the leaders of the Mensheviks and SRs. From May to the
October seizure of power, there is a visible and steady decline
in the levels of support to both Mensheviks and SRs and a sharp
swing to the left.
The swing left is best illustrated by the events of the "July
Days." Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership had attempted to
temper the most militant sections of the party. But this proved
no easy task. Already in April, there had been clashes between
pro- and anti-government forces, as demonstrations of some
30,000 workers and sailors were organized by the Bolsheviks. On
June 9, the Bolsheviks found themselves having to call off a
peaceful demonstration in Petrograd where their supporters were
going to demand the government resign. The majority in the
Soviets, citing the fear of anarchy, had banned the
demonstration. The party protested, but submitted. This only
infuriated thousands of workers—mainly against the Provisional
Government, but many also questioned the party’s decision to
avoid confrontation. An alternative, official Soviet
demonstration held some days later paraded overwhelmingly
pro-Bolshevik slogans.
The unavoidable confrontation came in July. Nearly a million
demonstrators took to the streets of Petrograd on July 4,
demanding an end to the war and the overthrow of the Provisional
Government. The Bolsheviks, having failed to restrain the
demonstrators, decided to join them. In the confrontations that
followed, there were hundreds of casualties. There is little
doubt that had the Bolshevik Party called for the overthrow of
the government, it could have achieved that aim. But Lenin and
others were clear that the rest of Russia wasn’t yet ready to
overthrow the Provisional Government. Aware of the Bolsheviks’
growing strength—and now terrified—the Provisional Government
banned the Bolshevik Party. Warrants were issued for the arrest
of key leaders of the Bolsheviks, including Lenin and Trotsky.
The Bolshevik press was banned and the printing presses smashed
to bits. Sukhanov writes in his memoirs that the Bolshevik Party
was finished.
But instead, it was the Provisional Government whose days
were numbered. With every passing day, it grew more unpopular,
its position more tenuous. Bolshevik Party membership increased
dramatically—transforming the party completely. In a report to
the Sixth Party Congress, held in August, Sverdlov reported that
party membership stood at 240,000. The report showed that in
Petrograd there were now 41,000 members, as against 15,000 in
April. In Moscow 50,900 as against 13,000. By October, the party
numbered 350,000.78
The growth of the party is all the more remarkable given that
the party was virtually driven underground after July. Alongside
the repression and intimidation came a well orchestrated
propaganda campaign to discredit and smear the Bolsheviks.
Lenin, in particular, was "exposed" as an agent of the Kaiser
and anything else they could invent—a slander campaign which is
still alive in many history books today! The repression was not
strong enough to crush the Bolsheviks. They continued to win
members and wider layers of support. The government campaign
against the left had one unintended effect—to virtually finish
any base the Mensheviks had among workers. As an historian of
the Mensheviks writes:
A few statistics tell the tale. In June the Mensheviks
elected 248 delegates to the first Congress of the Soviets,
whereas the Bolsheviks managed to elect only 105. But at the
second Congress of the Soviets, which met in October, there
were only 70 to 80 Menshevik delegates as against 300
Bolsheviks. During the early stages of the revolution the
largest Menshevik organization in Petrograd consisted of
10,000 members; but by October it had virtually ceased to
exist. "Membership dues," so wrote a Menshevik at the time,
"were not being paid, the circulation of the Workers’ Gazette
declined catastrophically, the last all-city conference did
not take place for lack of a quorum…The withdrawal from the
party of groups and individuals is an everyday occurrence."79
The government’s hard line also helped push large sections of
the SRs towards the Bolsheviks. But if the Mensheviks and the
SRs no longer had a mass base, they were of no use to the
reactionaries that made up the officer caste in the army, to the
bourgeoisie or to the middle classes. The call for a military
coup from the right began to be raised openly. In mid-August,
the Provisional Government tried to muster public support by
organizing a State Conference. To protest the conference, the
Bolsheviks called a general strike in Moscow that shut much of
the city down—yet another sign of the Bolshevik’s resurgence
from the July repression. During the proceedings General
Kornilov, Commander in Chief, talked about the need to restore
order in the army and at "the rear."
The army is conducting a ruthless struggle against anarchy,
and anarchy will be crushed…By a whole series of legislative
measures passed after the revolution by people whose
understanding and spirit were alien to the army, this army was
converted into the most reckless mob, which values nothing but
its own life…there can be no army without discipline.… The
prestige of the officers must be enhanced…There is no army
without a rear…The measures that are adopted at the front must
also be adopted in the rear.80
General Kornilov launched a coup attempt in late August. On
August 26, he sent a representative to demand the surrender of
the Provisional Government. He had the backing of all the top
generals, big business and the British and French governments.
But Kornilov’s coup failed largely because of the organized
resistance led by the Bolsheviks.
Lenin’s response to the Kornilov revolt was clear and
immediate: "The Kornilov revolt is a most unexpected and
downright unbelievably sharp turn in events. Like every sharp
turn, it calls for a revision and change of tactics."81
The Bolshevik Party must lead the resistance to Kornilov, Lenin
argued, because a successful coup from the right would be a
tremendous setback to the revolution. Thus, Bolsheviks and their
supporters were organized to fight Kornilov. This did not mean,
however, extending support to the government. "Even now we must
not support Kerensky’s government. This is unprincipled.… We
shall fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, just as
Kerensky’s troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the
contrary, we expose his weakness.82
"We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky.
Without in the least relaxing our hostility towards him, without
taking back a single word said against him, without renouncing
the task of overthrowing him."83
After four days, the coup collapsed. "The insurrection,"
Trotsky noted, "had rolled back, crumbled to pieces, been sucked
up by the earth."84 The forces of reaction were
completely demoralized, and the Kornilov’s defeat only
accelerated the decomposition of the Provisional Government.
The Masses On the Stage of History
THE GREATEST historian of the revolution, and one of its most
important participants, Leon Trotsky, described the significance
of revolution:
The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct
interference of the masses in historic events. In ordinary
times the state, be it monarchical or democratic, elevates
itself above the nation, and history is made by specialists in
that line of business—kings, ministers, bureaucrats,
parliamentarians, journalists. But at those crucial moments
when the old order becomes no longer endurable to the masses,
they break over the barriers excluding them from the political
arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and
create by their own interference the initial groundwork for a
new regime. Whether this is good or bad we leave to the
judgment of moralists. We ourselves will take the facts as
they are given by the objective course of development. The
history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of
the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of
rulership over their own destiny.85
Passivity gave way to self activity. As historian Marc Ferro
put it, "the citizens of the new Russia, having overthrown
Tsardom, were in a state of permanent mobilization." "All
Russia," wrote Sukhanov, "was constantly demonstrating in those
days."86
The revolution awakened a sense of power in ordinary people.
From the very depths of Russia came a great cry of hope in
which were mingled the voices of the poor and downtrodden,
expressing their sufferings, hopes and dreams. Dream-like,
they experienced unique events: in Moscow, workmen would
compel their employer to learn the bases of the workers’
rights in the future; in Odessa, students would dictate a new
way of teaching universal history to their professor; in
Petrograd, actors would take over from the theater manager and
select the next play; in the army, soldiers would summon the
chaplain to attend their meetings so that he could "get some
real meaning in his life." Even "children under the age of
fourteen" demanded the right to learn boxing "to make the
older children have some respect."87
No longer were discussions of the main issues facing ordinary
workers limited to the privileged and powerful. All questions of
politics and economics, of war and peace, of how to organize
society, were now the property of the masses. Krupskaya, Lenin’s
partner, describes the mood:
The streets in those days presented a curious spectacle:
everywhere people stood about in knots, arguing heatedly and
discussing the latest events.… These street meetings were so
interesting, that it once took me three hours to walk from
Shirokaya Street to the Krzesinska Mansion. The house in which
we lived overlooked a courtyard, and even here, if you opened
the window at night, you could hear a heated dispute. A
soldier would be sitting there, and he always had an
audience—usually some of the cooks, or housemaids from next
door, or some young people. An hour after midnight you could
catch snatches of talk—"Bolsheviks, Mensheviks.…" At three in
the morning "Miliukov, Bolsheviks.…" At five—still the same
street-corner-meeting talk, politics, etc. Petrograd’s white
nights are always associated in my mind with those all-night
political disputes.88
John Reed described how the thirst for knowledge and culture
was insatiable:
All Russia was learning to read, and reading—politics,
economics, history—because the people wanted to know…The
thirst for education, so long thwarted, burst with the
Revolution into a frenzy of expression. From Smolny Institute
[headquarters of the Soviet] alone, the first six months, went
out every day tons, car-loads, train-loads of literature,
saturating the land. Russia absorbed reading matter like hot
sand drinks water, insatiable. And it was not fables,
falsified history, diluted religion, and the cheap fiction
that corrupts—but social and economic theories, philosophy,
the works of Tolstoy, Gogol, and Gorky…
Then the talk…Lectures, debates, speeches—in theaters,
circuses, school-houses, clubs, Soviet meeting-rooms, union
headquarters, barracks.… Meetings in the trenches at the
Front, in village squares, factories.… What a marvelous sight
to see Putilovsky Zavod (the Putilov factory) pour out its
forty thousand to listen to Social Democrats, Socialist
Revolutionaries, Anarchists, anybody, whatever they had to
say, as long as they would talk! For months in Petrograd, and
all over Russia, every street-corner was a public tribune. In
railway trains, street-cars, always the spurting up of
impromptu debate, everywhere.…
…We came down to the front of the Twelfth Army, back of
Riga, where gaunt and bootless men sickened in the mud of
desperate trenches; and when they saw us they started up, with
their pinched faces and the flesh showing blue through their
torn clothing, demanding eagerly, "Did you bring anything to
read?"89
The Road to October
ON SEPTEMBER 1, the Bolsheviks won a majority in the
Petrograd Soviet. On September 5, the Moscow Soviet followed
suit. On September 9, Trotsky was elected president of the
Petrograd Soviet. A clear majority of the working class was
behind the Bolsheviks. Lenin launched an offensive within the
party to prepare for an armed uprising and seizure of power. He
met stiff resistance from the Bolshevik Central Committee. For
almost a month, Lenin insistently argued for the party to
prepare for an insurrection. Bukharin describes the response of
the Central Committee to one of Lenin’s letters.
The letter [of Lenin] was written with extraordinary force
and threatened us with all sorts of punishments. We all
gasped. Nobody had yet posed the question so abruptly…At first
all were bewildered. Afterwards, having talked it over, we
made a decision. Perhaps that was the sole case in the history
of our party when the Central Committee unanimously decided to
burn a letter from Lenin…90
Finally, on October 10, after bitter debate, the Central
Committee of the Bolshevik Party voted in favor of a rising.
Like every other ruling class, the Russian bourgeoisie and
aristocracy thought that nothing and no one could do without it.
The conservative daily Novoe Vromia, wrote on the morning after
the insurrection (October 26, 1917):
Let us suppose for a moment that the Bolsheviks do gain the
upper hand. Who will govern us then: the cooks perhaps, those
connoisseurs of cutlets and beefsteaks? Or maybe the firemen?
The stable boys, the chauffeurs? Or perhaps the nursemaids
will rush off to a meeting of the Council of State between the
diaper washing sessions? Who then? Where are the statesmen?
Perhaps the mechanics will run the theaters, the plumbers
foreign affairs, the carpenters, the post office. Who will it
be? History alone will give a definitive answer to this mad
ambition of the Bolsheviks.91
The principal responsibility for organizing the insurrection
fell to Trotsky, who, as president of the Soviet and head of the
Military-Revolutionary Committee (formed originally during the
Kornilov revolt), organized the insurrection. The actual seizure
of power involved relatively small numbers of people and had the
trappings of a military operation. As Sukhanov wrote, the broad
masses
had nothing to do on the streets. They did not have an
enemy which demanded their mass action, their armed forces,
battles and barricades…This was an especially happy
circumstance of our October Revolution, for which it is still
being slandered as a military rising and almost a palace coup.
It would be better if they asked: Did the Petrograd
proletariat sympathize or did it not with the organizers of
the October insurrection?… There are no two answers here. Yes,
the Bolsheviks acted on the mandate of the Petrograd workers
and soldiers.92
The months of advance and retreat, of revolutionary struggle,
ended on October 25. Trotsky describes the situation the morning
after the insurrection:
Next morning I pounced upon the bourgeois and
Menshevik-Populist papers. They had not even a word about the
uprising. The newspapers had been making such a to-do about
the coming action by armed soldiers, about the sacking, the
inevitable rivers of blood, about an insurrection, that now
they simply had failed to notice an uprising that was actually
taking place. In the meantime, without confusion, without
street-fights, almost without firing or bloodshed, one
institution after another was being occupied by detachments of
soldiers, sailors, and the Red Guards…
…A delegation from the municipal Duma called to see me and
asked me a few inimitable questions. "Do you propose military
action? If so, what, and when?" The Duma would have to know of
this "not less than twenty-four hours in advance." What
measures had the Soviet taken to ensure safety and order? And
so on, and so forth.
"Will you dissolve us for being opposed to the transfer of
power to the Soviets?"
I replied: "The present Duma reflects yesterday: if a
conflict arises, we will propose to the people that they elect
a new Duma on the issue of power." The delegation left as it
had come, but it had left behind it the feeling of an assured
victory. Something had changed during the night. Three weeks
ago we had gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet. We were
hardly more than a banner—with no printing-works, no funds, no
branches. No longer ago than last night, the government
ordered the arrest of the Military-Revolutionary Committee,
and was engaged in tracing our address. Today a delegation
from the city Duma comes to the ‘arrested’
Military-Revolutionary Committee to inquire about the fate of
the Duma.93
Trotsky then describes a conversation he has with Lenin:
The power is taken over, at least in Petrograd.… Lenin
…looks softly at me, with that sort of awkward shyness that
with him indicates intimacy. "You know," he says hesitatingly,
"from persecution and life underground, to come so suddenly
into power.…" He pauses for the right word. "Es schwindet [it
makes one giddy]," he concludes, changing suddenly into
German, and circling his hand around his head. We look at each
other and laugh a little. All this takes only a minute or two;
then a simple "passing to next business."94
The promise of human emancipation was paramount in the minds
of those who led the revolution. In one of his most moving
passages, Lenin wrote:
Hitherto the whole creative genius of the human intellect
has labored only to give the advantages of technique and
civilization to the few, and to deprive the rest of the most
elementary necessities—education and free development. But now
all the marvels of technique, all the conquests of
civilization, are the property of the whole people, and
henceforth human intellect and genius will never be twisted
into a means of oppression, a means of exploitation. We know
this: surely it is worth striving with all our might to
fulfill this stupendous historic task? The workers will carry
out this titanic historic labor, for there are vast
revolutionary powers slumbering in them, vast powers of
renovation and regeneration.95
In a similar vein, Trotsky writes in his autobiography, My
Life:
Marxism considers itself the conscious expression of the
unconscious historical process. But the "unconscious process"
in the historical-philosophical sense of the term—not in the
psychological—coincides with its conscious expression only at
its highest point when the masses, by sheer elemental pressure
break through the social routine and give victorious
expression to the deepest needs of historical development. And
at such moments the highest theoretical consciousness of the
epoch merges with the immediate action of those oppressed
masses who are furthest away from theory. The creative union
of the conscious with the unconscious is what one usually
calls ‘inspiration.’ Revolution is the inspired frenzy of
history…96
Rosa Luxemburg, who leveled some strong criticisms of the
Bolsheviks, summed up the Russian Revolution’s historical
significance:
The Russian Revolution is the mightiest event of the World
War.…
Whatever a party could offer of courage, revolutionary
farsightedness and consistency in an historic hour, Lenin,
Trotsky and the other comrades have given in good measure. All
the revolutionary honor and capacity which western social
democracy lacked were represented by the Bolsheviks. Their
October uprising was not only the actual salvation of the
Russian Revolution; it was also the salvation of the honor of
international socialism.…
Everything that happens in Russia is comprehensible and
represents an inevitable chain of causes and effects, the
starting point and end term of which are: the failure of the
German proletariat and the occupation of Russia by German
imperialism. It would be demanding something superhuman from
Lenin and his comrades if we should expect of them that under
such circumstances they should conjure forth the finest
democracy, the most exemplary dictatorship of the proletariat
and a flourishing socialist economy…
The danger begins only when they make a virtue of necessity
forced upon them by these fatal circumstances…and want to
recommend them to the international proletariat as a model of
socialist tactics.…
What is in order is to distinguish the essential from the
non-essential, the kernel from the accidental excrescences in
the policies of the Bolsheviks.…
It is not a matter of this or that secondary question of
tactics, but of the capacity for action of the proletariat,
the strength to act, the will to power of socialism as such.
In this, Lenin and Trotsky and their friends were the first,
those who went ahead as an example to the proletariat of the
world; they are still the only ones up to now who can cry with
Hutten: ‘I have dared!’
This is the essential and enduring in Bolshevik policy. In
this sense theirs is the immortal historical service of having
marched at the head of the international proletariat with the
conquest of political power and the practical placing of the
problem of the realization of socialism, and having advanced
mightily the settlement of the score between capital and labor
in the entire world. In Russia the problem could only be
posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in this sense,
the future everywhere belongs to ‘bolshevism.’97
Today, we still need to fight for the "great awakening of the
personality," as Trotsky put it. The day will come, not easily,
not automatically, but it will come, when we can talk once more
of "a great awakening of the personality" in the U.S. and
internationally.
NOTES:
1 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 28 (Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 292-293.
2 Quoted in John Rees, "In Defense of October," in
International Socialism 52, Autumn 1991, London, p. 9.
3 Ibid.
4 Philip Foner, editor, The Bolshevik Revolution: Its
Impact on American Radicals, Liberals and Labor
(International Publishers, New York, 1967), p. 20.
5 For those interested in pursuing any particular aspect of
the Russian Revolution see the suggested reading list for a good
start.
6 Isaac Deutscher writes in The Prophet Outcast: "For two
hours, speaking in German, he addressed an audience of about
2,000 people. His theme was the Russian Revolution. As the
authorities had allowed the lecture on the condition that he
would avoid controversy, he spoke in a somewhat professorial
manner, giving the audience the quintessence of the three
volumes of his just concluded History. His restraint did not
conceal the depth and force of this conviction; the address was
a vindication of the October Revolution, all the more effective
because free of apologetics and frankly acknowledging partial
failures and mistakes. Nearly twenty-five years later members of
the audience still recalled the lecture with vivid appreciation
as an oratorical feat." Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast,
Trotsky: 1929-1940 (Oxford University Press, London, 1970),
pp.184-185.
7 Marcel Liebman, The Russian Revolution (Jonathan
Cape, London, 1970), p. 17 (see foot 50).
8 Ibid., p. 24.
9 Ibid., p. 19.
10 Dominic Lieven, "Russia, Europe and World War I," in
Edward Acton, Vladimir Iu. Cherniaev, William Rosenberg, eds.,
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921
(Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Ind.,
1997), p. 37.
11 Leon Trotsky, Stalin (Grosset and Dunlap, New York,
1941), p. 422.
12 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution
(Pluto Press, London, 1997), p. 31. Hereafter referred to as
HRR.
13 S. A. Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories
1917-1918 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983), pp.
9-10.
14 One dessiatine equals 2.7 acres.
15 Leon Trotsky Speaks, pp. 252-255.
16 HRR, p. 19.
17 Neil Harding, ed., Marxism in Russia: Key Documents
1879-1906 (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 16.
18 Paul Le Blanc, Lenin and the Revolutionary Party
(Humanities Press International Inc.: Atlantic Highlands, NJ,
1990), pp. 17-18.
19 Ibid., p. 18.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
22 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
23 Neil Harding, op. cit., p. 224.
24 Paul Frölich, Rosa Luxemburg (Pluto Press, London,
1970), p. 89.
25 V.I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the
Democratic Revolution," in Collected Works, Volume 9
(Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 57.
26 Quoted in Cliff, Lenin, Volume 1, p. 143.
27 V.I. Lenin, Volume 9, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
28 Duncan Hallas, Trotsky’s Marxism (Pluto Press,
London, 1978), p. 15.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Leon Trotsky Speaks, Ed. by Sarah Novell
(Pathfinder Press, New York, 1972) p. 256.
32 Leon Trotsky, 1905 (Pelican Books, Middlesex,
England, 1973), p. 122.
33 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
34 Leon Trotsky, My Life (Penguin Books, Ltd.,
Middlesex, England, 1974), p. 180.
35 Ernest Mandel, "Rosa Luxemburg and German Social
Democracy," in Revolutionary Marxism and Social Reality in
the 20th Century (Humanities Press International Inc.:
Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1994), pp. 37-38.
36 Julius Braunthal, History of the International,
1864-1914 (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Publishers, New York,
1967), p. 298.
37 Neil Harding, Lenin’s Political Thought (Humanities
Press International Inc.: Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1983), p. 249.
38 David Mandel, "Intelligentsia and the Working Class in
1917," Critique 14, 1981, London, pp. 69-70.
39 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, The Politics of Industrial
Mobilization in Russia, 1914-1917 (The Macmillan Press,
Ltd., London, 1983), p. 18.
40 Quoted in Olga Hess Gankin and H.H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks
and the World War: The Origin of the Third International
(Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1976), p. 59.
41 Leon Trotsky, My Life, p. 257.
42 Trotsky, HRR, p. 42.
43 Tony Cliff, Lenin: All Power to the Soviets, Volume
2 (Pluto Press, London, 1976), p.64.
44 Alexander Shlyapnikov, On the Eve of 1917: Reminiscences
from the Revolutionary Underground (Allison & Busby, London,
1982), p. 224.
45 Paul Dukes, October and the World: Perspectives on the
Russian Revolution (Macmillan Press, London, 1979), p. 85.
46 Leon Trotsky, 1905, op. cit., p. 91.
47 Quoted in Tony Cliff, Lenin, Volume 2, op. cit., p.
62.
48 HRR, p. 121.
49 Ibid.
50 Marcel Liebman, Leninism Under Lenin (Jonathan
Cape, Ltd., London, 1975), pp. 117-118. The Bolshevik Party did
not issue its first leaflet until February 27. Sukhanov notes
that the Bolshevik Party leaders present at the start of the
February Revolution were unsure of themselves. He describes a
meeting on February 25th at which their "flatfootedness or, more
properly, their incapacity to think their way into the political
problem and formulate it, had a depressing effect on us." Quoted
in Liebman, op. cit.,p. 117.
51 HRR, p. 102.
52 Ibid., p. 123.
53 Lionel Kochan, Russia in Revolution (Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, London, 1966) p. 186.
54 Ibid., p. 187.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 188.
59 Ibid., p. 189.
60 Liebman, Leninism, op. cit., p. 121.
61 Kochan, op. cit., p. 212.
62 Ibid.
63 Cliff, Lenin, Volume 2, p. 94.
64 Lenin, op. cit., 1p. 104.
65 Kochan, op. cit., p. 207.
66 Quoted in Cliff, Volume 2, pp. 119-120.
67 Quoted in Cliff, Volume 2, p. 121.
68 Liebman, Leninism, op. cit., p. 129.
69 Ibid., p. 131.
70 Ibid., p. 130.
71 Quoted in LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 252
72 Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 24 (Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 22-23.
73 Liebman, Leninism, op. cit., p. 132.
74 HRR, p. 337.
75 Kochan, op. cit., p. 223.
76 Ibid., pp. 229-230. The total number of deserters reached
more than 2 million by October 1917.
77 Ibid., p. 235.
78 Liebman, Leninism, op. cit., p. 158.
79 Duncan Hallas, "All Power to the Soviets," in
International Socialism 90, July/August, 1976, London, p.
19.
80 Quoted in Tony Cliff, Lenin, Volume 2, pp. 290-291.
81 Ibid., p. 298.
82 Ibid., p. 299.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 304.
85 HRR, p. 17.
86 Liebman, op. cit., p. 201.
87 Marc Ferro, October 1917 (Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1980), p. 2.
88 N.K. Krupskaya, Reminiscences of Lenin
(International Publishers, New York 1979), pp. 351-352.
89 John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, p. 14-15.
90 Cliff, Lenin, Volume 2, p. 339.
91 Tony Cliff, Lenin: Revolution Besieged, Volume 3
(Pluto Press, London, 1978), pp.1-2.
92 Quoted in LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 282.
93 Trotsky, My Life, op.cit., pp. 338-339.
94 Ibid., pp. 351-352.
95 Liebman, op. cit., p. 197.
96 Trotsky, My Life, op. cit., pp. 348-349.
97 Rosa Luxemburg, "The Russian Revolution," Rosa
Luxemburg Speaks (Pathfinder Press, New York, 1980), pp.
394-395. |